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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of FRANCHOT MURPHY, 83-A-3 178,
Petitimer,
-againstSTATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT DIVISION OF PAROLE APPEALS
UNIT,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI ## 01-10-ST1337 Index No. 651-10
Appearances:

Franchot Murphy
Inmate No. 83-A-3 178
Petitioner, Pro Se
Altona Correctional Facility
5 5 5 Devils Den Road
P.O. Box 3000
Altona, New York 12910-2090
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New Yclrk
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Cathy Y. Sheehan,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate at Altona Correctional Facility, commenced the instant
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CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated February 1 1,
2009 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of twenty
five years to life for murder in the second degree, as well as a term of five to fifteen years for
attempted robbery in the first degree. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition,
petitioner contends that the board failed to apply all of the Executive Law $2594 factors.
Petitioner asserts his denial of parole amounts to a re-sentencing. Petitioner contends his
twenty four month hold is excessive. Petitioner also argues that the court considered
unlawful information such as his juvenile records and records of arrest to determine whether
petitioner should be paroled.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“After a careful review of the record, your appearance before
the parole board, and deliberation, parole is denied. The instant
offense murder 2nd and att. Robbery 1st involved you being
found guilty of shooting the manager of a business causing his
death during an attempted robbery. This behavior exhibited a
depraved indifference to human life. Your criminal history
dates back to the 1970’sas an adjudicated Y.O. Since your last
appearance before the parole board you have incurred two Tier
I1 disciplinary infractions, your most recent a Tier I1 for property
unauthorized and vandalktealing in December 2008 for which
you provided an explanation. During your interview you
appeared to have given much thought to your values and
discussed how you believe you have gained a value system since
the instant offense. However you spoke little about how your
actions took the life of another. What we do not see is a
legitimate release plan. While there is a letter from one family
member there are no letters of reasonable assurance from
agencies/organizations willing to assist you, letters from
potential employers, or other various letters of support.
Consideration has been given to your completion of correction
prognms and positive demeanor. Continue to Ilbcus on positive
life goals, refrain from future tickets and develop a release plan.
2
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This panel finds your release at this time is not in the best
interest of society making parole inappropriate for you at this
time.”

The Court notes that because there was no formal hearing in this instance, the standard
of review is not whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence, but rather
whether the determination is in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law,
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Pel1 v Bd.
of Educ., 34 NY2d 222 [ 19741).
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
perfnrmance; if my, ns a pnrticipant in a temporary relcasiprogram; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
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200 11). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,
the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
supra). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part

of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting ‘vl,, I l t L I
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Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon
release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the
denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of
Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; i h u u d i i l i i ~ d i c dL. liussi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept.,
19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD24 677 [3rd neyt.,
19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of
the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Maiter 01 U eii L. h e w 1’0i-A

Slate Division

of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board
of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept.,
1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629
[3rJ Dcpi., lY971; Maircr of

~ d i c ivi

b u i i ~ a l c 2.54
~ , ALIA 550 [3rd Dcyi., 19YSJ). Tht-
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Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one

(see

Matter of Young v New Ynrk D ~ < , i oof
n Parole, 74 AD3d 1681 [3rdDept., 20101; Matter
of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor must the
parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive
Law 6 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rdDept., 20061).
In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place
particular emphasis on, the circumstances ofthe crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated,
as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in
determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’
whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether
release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’
(Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041,
quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations omitted).
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencine, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition azainst multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit

(see Matter of Bockeno v New York State

Se w f’ur-kblare k,xel;uliw
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961; hfarrerd C ~ C Wv h

Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has
served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty
iiilcLcbL iii
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C I , 11 14, 1115 [3-i Dcpt.,
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20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rdDept., 20061 Iv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).
In addition, the Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (seeMatter of Tatta
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98
NY2d 604).

TOthe extent that the Parole Board considered petitioner’s youthfil offender record,
that would appear to be proper

(see Criminal

Procedure Law

5

720.35 [2])’.

Even if

petitioner’s parole records improperly include arrest information with regard to sealed
criminal matters, there is no evidence that the Board relied upon this information in making
its determination, and any alleged error would appear to be harmless (seeMatter of Gardiner
v New York State Division of Parole, 48 AD3d 87 1, 872 [3rdDept., 20081).
The Court hac reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds

‘Criminal Procedure Law 6 720.35[2] recites, in part, as follows:
“[elxcept where specifically required or permitted by statute or
upon specific authorization of the court, all official records and
papers ...relating to a case involving a youth who has been
adjudicated a youthful offender, are confidential and may not be
made available to any person or public or private agency, other
than ...the division of parole and a probation department of this
state that requires such official records and papers for the purpose
of carrying out duties specifically authorized by law.”
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them to be without merit2. The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not
irrational, in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary
and capricious. The Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.
ENTER
Dated:

September 3 0 , 2 0 10
Troy, New York

George B. Ceresia, Jr.
Supreme Court Justice

Papers Considered:
1.

2.

1

Order To Show Cause dated March 1 1, 20 10, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated May 13,2010, Supporting Papers and Exhibits

1hc: court

has limited its review to those arguments and grounds expressly raised by the

petitioner.
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